\u3ci\u3ePeople v. Dekens\u3c/i\u3e: The Expansion of the Felony-Murder Doctrine in Illinois by Houck, Kara M.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 30
Issue 2 Winter 1999 Article 6
1999
People v. Dekens: The Expansion of the Felony-
Murder Doctrine in Illinois
Kara M. Houck
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kara M. Houck, People v. Dekens: The Expansion of the Felony-Murder Doctrine in Illinois, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 357 (1999).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol30/iss2/6
People v. Dekens: The Expansion of the Felony-
Murder Doctrine in Illinois
1. INTRODUCTION
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence ....
[W]hen [Judges] are called upon to say how far existing rules
are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare of
society fix the path, its direction and its distance . . . . 'Justice
and general utility, such will be the two objectives that will direct
our [Judges'] course."
One of the earliest judicially crafted rules designed to protect the
welfare of society was the felony-murder rule.2 This rule creates
liability for murder when an unintended death occurs during the
commission of a felony.3 Judges originally developed the felony-
murder rule to comport with the innate objectives of justice and general
utility.4 When this rule is altered in any way, judges must reassess the
objectives of justice and general utility that would be served by the
rule's restriction or expansion, letting the welfare of society dictate its
final form.5 Justice Cardozo's goals, unfortunately, are more easily
articulated than applied.6
The felony-murder doctrine7 historically applied to situations where
I. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66-67, 75 (1921).
Justice Cardozo explained how philosophy, custom, and social welfare helped develop
the common law in general and his decisions. See id. passim. Justice Cardozo believed
that social justice was one of the strongest forces that helped guide judicial decisions,
especially when a criminal has taken an innocent life. See id. at 65-66. Social justice
should "be given such weight as sound judgment dictates." Id. at 67.
2. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §
7.5, at 206-07 & n.4 (1986) (establishing the purpose of the felony-murder rule at early
common law).
3. See id. at 206; see also infra Part II.A.
4. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206-07 (explaining how the felony-
murder rule did not create an injustice at early common law).
5. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 74-75.
6. See, e.g., People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474, 480 (Il. 1998) (Bilandic, J.,
dissenting) (describing the majority opinion as lacking a just analysis); see id. at 481
(Heiple, J., dissenting) (implying that the majority decision did not justly interpret the
law).
7. The word "doctrine" and "rule" are used interchangeably throughout this Note to
acknowledge the different usage by the various judges and authors when referring to
felony-murder.
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a defendant committed a felony and, in the process, unintentionally
killed an innocent victim.8 Courts implemented the doctrine to help
protect victims of felonies from further harm during the commission of
those felonies.9 More recently courts expanded the felony-murder rule
to instances where someone other than the felon committed the
homicide.'0 In People v. Dekens,1 the Illinois Supreme Court
decided the issue of a felon's liability under the rule where the intended
victim kills a co-felon.12 Although other courts have been reluctant to
apply the felony-murder doctrine when a police officer kills a co-
felon,' 3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a felon can be liable for
8. See 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 147, at 295 (15th ed.
1994); infra note 35 (discussing the theory of transferred intent); see also
Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (Mass. 1965) (acknowledging that
under the felony-murder rule, the felon did not need to intend to kill the victim);
Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 475-76 (Pa. 1958) (recognizing that malice
aforethought is not essential in felony-murder cases).
9. See TORCIA, supra note 8, § 147, at 300. The purpose of the law was to protect
innocent lives. See id.; see also King v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (Va.
Ct. App. 1988); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206-07.
10. See TORCIA, supra note 8, § 147, at 300-01 (discussing the possibility of
liability when someone other than the felon kills the victim).
11. People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1998).
12. See id. at 475.
13. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 207-08 (recognizing that most
jurisdictions do not attach liability under the felony-murder doctrine when a party other
than the felon or co-felon committed the homicide). See, e.g., People v. Washington,
402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (establishing that the defendant could not be liable for
first-degree murder while committing a first-degree robbery because the homicide must
be committed by a felon or a co-felon); Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159, 163-64 (Del.
1980) (concluding that the felons were not responsible for the death of a co-felon
because the felons did not commit the homicide); State v. Crane, 279 S.E.2d 695 (Ga.
1981) (holding that the felon who committed a robbery was not guilty under the felony-
murder statute for the murder committed by an intended victim of the crime); State v.
Murrell, 585 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Kan. 1978) (noting that the jury acquitted a felon charged
with felony-murder because the robbery victim killed the co-felon); Campbell v. State,
444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (Md. 1982) (reversing the surviving co-felon's conviction under
the felony-murder rule because during the armed robbery either the police or the robbery
victim killed the co-felon); Clark County Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev.
1973) (reasoning that the felony-murder rule was inapplicable when the intended victim
of the burglary killed the co-felon); Jackson v. State, 589 P.2d 1052, 1053 (N.M. 1979)
(concluding that the co-felon was not responsible for the death of his co-felon whom the
intended victim killed during the commission of a robbery); State v. Jones, 859 P.2d
514, 515 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that the felony-murder doctrine prohibited
the prosecution of cases in which someone other than a felon killed the victims);
Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 482-83 (Pa. 1958) (establishing that an
armed robber was not guilty under the felony-murder rule because the police killed the co-
felon); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 811, 816 (Va. 1981) (acknowledging
that an armed robber could not be responsible for the death of a co-felon when the
robbery victim killed the co-felon).
People v. Dekens
the death of a co-felon under the rule. 14 In Dekens, the defendant
asserted that attaching liability to a felon when a third party killed a
guilty co-felon was beyond the scope of the felony-murder doctrine. 15
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed in a four to three decision.' 6
The majority held that any death that proximately results from the
defendant's felony or attempted felony will be punished under the
felony-murder doctrine.17
This Note first traces the felony-murder doctrine's historical
development from a common law doctrine in England,18 to its
development and statutory codification in the United States,' 9 and in
Illinois.2 ° This Note then compares the two theories that have
developed to determine the degree of liability that should attach under
the felony-murder rule: the agency theory of liability2 and the
proximate cause theory of liability.22 This Note next discusses the
facts of Dekens,23 the lower courts' decisions,24 the opinion of the
Dekens majority, 25 and the separate dissenting opinions of Justice
Bilandic2 6 and Justice Heiple. 27 This Note then criticizes the Dekens
majority for expanding the felony-murder rule beyond its intended
purposes 28 without valid legal precedent.2 9 This Note contends that
Justice Heiple's opinion, espousing the agency theory of liability for
the felony-murder doctrine, is the correct position and should be
adopted in Illinois.3° Finally, this Note predicts that the harsh result of
14. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 477.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. The court only inquired as to "whether the decedent's death [was] the direct
and proximate result of the defendant's felony." Id. In so holding, the court utilized the
proximate cause theory of liability for felony-murder as opposed to the agency theory of
liability. See id.; infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the agency theory of liability); see also
infra Part II.B.2 (explaining the proximate cause theory of liability).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part l.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra Part II.B.1.
22. See infra Part II.B.2.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See infra Part III.C.
26. See infra Part III.D.
27. See infra Part III.E.
28. See infra Part IV.A.
29. See infra Part IV.A.I (discussing the intended purpose of the felony-murder
doctrine); infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the use of the felony-murder rule as a deterrence
factor).
30. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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Dekens will not only fail to reduce the crime rate but will also derogate
society's fundamental values of justice and fairness.31
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of the Felony-Murder Doctrine in England
The felony-murder doctrine derived from early English common
law. 32 Under the common law felony-murder rule, an act that resulted
in the death of a person during the commission, or attempted
commission, of any felony was a murder.33 The English common law
rule applied irrespective of the defendant's conduct while committing
the felony or the potential danger of the specific felony the defendant
committed .3  Therefore, regardless of whether the felon specifically
intended to kill or merely intended to commit a felony, the felon was a
murderer if a person died.35
3 1. See infra Part V.
32. See Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility For the Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 50, 58 (1956). Scholars believe English courts first began applying
the felony-murder rule in 1535. See John S. Anooshian, Note, Should Courts Use
Principles of Justification and Excuse to Impose Felony-Murder Liability?, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 451, 454 (1988) (citing Lord Dacres, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535)). In Lord
Dacres, Lord Dacres and his companions went hunting illegally in a park. See id. (citing
72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535)). The group made a prior agreement that any person who
defied a member of the group would be killed. See id. (citing 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B.
1535)). In accordance with the agreement, one of Lord Dacres' companions killed
another person. See id. (citing 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535)). At the time of the
killing, Lord Dacres was removed from the group and was not cognizant of the killing;
however, he and his companions were charged with murder. See id. (citing 72 Eng. Rep.
458 (K.B. 1535)).
33. See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 267 (Del. 1967), aff'd sub nom Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969). In 1644, Coke illustrated felony-murder as the
following:
If a man shoots at a wild fowl and accidentally kills a man, that is an excusable
homicide because the act of shooting is not unlawful; but if a man shoots at a
cock or hen belonging to another man and accidentally kills a man, that is
murder because the act in unlawful.
TORCIA, supra note 8, § 147, at 295-96.
34. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206-07 & n.3 (citing the MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980)). The doctrine applies without concern for whether
the felon killed the decedent "intentionally, recklessly, negligently, or accidentally and
unforeseeably." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 479 (2d ed. 1995).
35. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206-07; see also Powers v.
Commonwealth, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (Ky. 1901); Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law
Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1919 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Felony
Murder]. At early common law, it was generally accepted that the intent for felony-
murder came from the intent to commit the felony. See TORCIA, supra note 8, § 147, at
295. When an unintended death accompanied an intended felony, the law transferred the
intent to perpetrate the felony to the killing. See id. at 296-97.
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Although few crimes constituted felonies during this period, all of
the crimes categorized as felonies 36 carried a mandatory sentence of
death.37 Therefore, when the felony-murder doctrine originated, the
felon could be executed for either the initial felony or the death
resulting from the felony. 3' Regardless of whether the prosecution
initially charged the defendant with a felony, felony-murder, or both, a
felony conviction required a sentence of death.39 Thus, a conviction
for felony-murder did not alter the defendant's fate. 4°
Over time, the application of the felony-murder rule became more
restrictive.4" While the legislature classified more crimes as felonies,
death was no longer a required punishment for all felonies.42 Thus,
the sentences for some felonies were not as serious as the sentence for
murder.43 The evolution of criminal law sentencing created a need for
a reconsideration of the felony-murder doctrine." Thus, the rule was
eventually modified through judicial decisions.4 5 Even with
36. Compare State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 881 (Minn. 1992) (claiming "all
felonies were punishable by death"), and LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 207
n.4 (declaring, "all felonies were punishable by death"), and TORCIA, supra note 8, §
147, at 305 (asserting, "all felonies were punishable by death "), with Powers, 61 S.W.
at 741 (stating, "practically all felonies were punishable with death "), and
Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (Pa. 1958) (contending "practically all,
if not all, felonies were punishable by death").
37. See Powers, 61 S.W. at 741 (representing how the impact of the felony-murder
doctrine has changed since the early common law); Branson, 487 N.W.2d at 881-82
(discussing the development of the felony-murder rule); Redline, 137 A.2d at 476
(noting that the sentence for any convicted felon was death).
38. See Powers, 61 S.W. at 741-42 (tracing the history of the felony-murder
doctrine); Branson, 487 N.W.2d at 881-82; Redline, 137 A.2d at 476.
39. See Powers, 61 S.W. at 741; Branson, 487 N.W.2d at 881-82; Redline, 137 A.2d
at 476 (acknowledging the reasons for the lack of opposition to the felony-murder
doctrine in the early common law).
40. See Powers, 61 S.W. at 741 (explaining why the extremely strict punishments for
felony-murder were acceptable at early common law); Branson, 487 N.W.2d at 881-82;
Redline, 137 A.2d at 476.
41. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206-11 (hypothesizing that courts
wanted to "alleviate the harshness of the rule" because the application of the felony-
murder doctrine in modem criminal law differed from early common law).
42. See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 268 (Del. 1967), aff'd sub nom Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (acknowledging that restrictions to the felony-murder
doctrine became necessary as felonies began to encompass lesser offenses).
43. See Branson, 487 N.W.2d at 882 (realizing that in modern criminal law there are
many offense levels and corresponding punishments for felonies).
44. See id. at 881-82 (describing how the common law felony-murder development
coincided with the development of modem criminal law).
45. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 207 & n.7. For example, the
English Courts in Regina v. Horse), held that liability only attached under the felony-
murder doctrine if the homicide was a probable and natural consequence of the felon's
action. See Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129, 131 (Assiz. 1862).
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modifications, the rule proved unworkable, and the English courts
eliminated the felony-murder rule by 1957.46
B. Development of the Felony-Murder Doctrine in the United States
In contrast to England, state legislatures firmly established the
felony-murder doctrine in their jurisdictions by 1957. 47 Like its
English counterpart, 48 America first adopted the felony-murder
doctrine in an unqualified and unlimited form: 49 a death that occurred
as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony was
murder.5" Despite the constant criticisms51 of the felony-murder rule
and its subsequent abolition in England, the rule has remained
imbedded in the criminal law system of the United States.5 2 The
felony-murder rule has been sustained in almost53 all American
jurisdictions, even if not in its original form.5 4 Through various
46. See Anooshian, supra note 31, at 455 (citing Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2,
ch. 1 1, § I (Eng.)) (abolishing the felony-murder doctrine through a legislative statute).
The English courts found the rule to be impracticable because the amount of crimes
categorized as felonies broadened, and the corresponding sentence of death was too
harsh to impose for all homicides that occurred during the commission of any of the
numerous felonies. See id.
47. See infra note 63 (listing state felony-murder statutes); see generally TORCIA,
supra note 8, § 147 (examining how the felony-murder doctrine was codified in
jurisdictions in the United States).
48. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text for an explanation of the English
felony-murder doctrine.
49. See Thomas R. Hoecker, Comment, Felony Murder in Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L. F.
685, 685-86 (1974) (describing the transition of the felony-murder rule from England to
the United States).
50. See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 267 (Del. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (describing the common law definition of the felony-
murder rule).
5 1. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446-53 (1985) (noting that those
opposed to the rule characterize it as "an insupportable legal fiction" and an unjust
"legal proposition"). The felony-murder doctrine often results in an unjust outcome.
See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 481. If two people commit the same felony, they should
both be punished similarly. See id. Thus, if one of the felons unintentionally kills
another while committing the felony, that person has no more culpability than the other
felon and should not be subject to the stringent sentences designated for murderers. See
id.
52. See Morris, supra note 32, at 58-59 (commenting on the establishment of the
felony-murder doctrine in the United States).
53. Two jurisdictions have abolished the felony-murder rule by state statute.
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707.701 (Michie 1998) and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507.020 (Michie 1997). Michigan has abolished the felony-murder rule by common
law. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328-29 (Mich. 1980).
54. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206.
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modifications of state criminal law,55 the felony-murder doctrine has
changed considerably.56
Jurisdictions have restricted the felony-murder doctrine in four
distinct ways. 57  First, states have reduced the types of felonies
applicable under the felony-murder doctrine.58 Second, jurisdictions
have given stricter interpretations to the proximate cause element. 59
Third, states have shortened the time period in which both the felony
and the death must occur. 60 Finally, jurisdictions have directed that the
death of the victim must be independent of the intended felony for
felony-murder liability to attach.6'
States have also modified the scope of the felony-murder rule
through the codification of the common law rule.62 Through statutes,
55. See id. § 7.5 at 206-11. The restrictions limited the use and effect of the felony-
murder rule. See id.
56. See id. § 7.5 at 206-07. The changes were necessary because absurd results were
possible without the modifications:
[S]uppose a statute makes it a felony to sell intoxicating liquor; yet if the
purchaser should drink so much as to fall asleep in a blizzard on the way home
and die of exposure, the seller ought not to be deemed a murderer, even through
the felony actually caused the death in the sense that, but for the felony, the
death would not have occurred. It is a felony to make a false tax return; but if
the revenue agent investigating the taxpayer's return should slip on the
taxpayer's front steps and break his neck, the taxpayer ought not to be guilty
of murder, though his act in filing a false return may have been an actual cause
of death.
Id. § 7.5 at 207 (footnote omitted).
57. See id. § 7.5 at 206.
58. See id. § 7.5 at 208-09. Felony-murder is often restricted to those felonies
classified as inherently dangerous to life. See id. § 7.5 at 208. See, e.g., Jenkins v.
State, 230 A.2d 262, 269 (Del. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213
(1969) (establishing that the felony-murder rule is limited to felonies that are
"foreseeably dangerous to human life").
59. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 573
A.2d 1359, 1375 (N.J. 1990) (concluding that the homicide "must be the probable
consequence of the defendant's conduct").
60. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206. See, e.g., State v. Leech, 790
P.2d 160, 163 (Wash. 1990) (deciding that the killing must have a causal relationship
and occur in the same time and place as the actual felony).
6 1. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206. See, e.g., People v. Ireland,
450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969) (holding that the felony-murder doctrine did not apply
when the felony was an "integral part of the homicide"). In Ireland, the California
Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant could not be charged with felony-murder if "it is
based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence
produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense
charged." 450 P.2d at 590 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, the
defendant in Ireland could not be charged with felony-murder for stabbing his wife
because the offense of murder included felonious assault. See id.
62. See Hoecker, supra note 49, at 685-86. Generally, state statutes did not establish
new crimes. See 40 Am. JUR. 2D Homicide § 72, at 365 (1968). Most often the states
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state legislatures have created various deviations and restrictions to the
felony-murder doctrine. 63 Most states64 have maintained that no
specific mental element is necessary to convict the accused of felony-
murder. 65  Furthermore, most state statutes are similar in that they
merely modified the common law rule when the states codified it. See id.
63. See Note, Felony Murder, supra note 35, at 1919. An example of a statute reads as
follows:
All murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any rape in any degree, sexual offense in the first or second degree,
sodomy, mayhem, robbery, carjacking or armed carjacking, burglary in the
first, second, or third degree, a violation . . . of this article concerning
destructive devices, kidnapping as defined in ... this article, or in the escape
or attempt to escape from . . . any institution or facility under the jurisdiction
of the Division of Correction of the Division of Pretrial Detention and
Services, or from any jail or penal institution in any of the counties of this
State, shall be murder in the first degree.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (Supp. 1998). See also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(3) (Michie
1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(3) (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1105(A)(2) (West Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(4) (Michie 1997); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102(l)(b) (West
1990 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West 1994 & Supp. 1998);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(6) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
2401 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (1996); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-
l(a)(3) (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(2)-(3) (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 707.2(2) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(b) (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:30.1(2)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 202(1)
(West 1997 & Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1998); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.316(1)(b) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.19(2)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1999); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.021(t)(2) (West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
102(1)(b) (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303(2) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.030(l)(b) (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:l-b(1)(b) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-3(a)(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 1978 &
Supp. 1998); N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.25(3) (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1)(a) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.1(B)
(West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7B (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
163.115(1)(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2502(b) (West
1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (Michie 1998);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1997 & Supp. 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
19.02(b)(3) (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (1995 & Supp. 1998); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (1)(4)(5) (Michie 1996 &
Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999); W.
VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (West 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
6-2-101(a) (Michie 1997).
64. Several states have enacted statutes that compel a specific mental state. For
example, in Arkansas the death must have occurred "under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(1)
(Michie 1997). In Delaware, liability attaches if "the person recklessly causes the death
of another person." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2) (1995).
65. See Note, Felony Murder, supra note 35, at 1919. The statute requires a mental
state for a conviction under other forms of murder. See id. Courts have characterized the
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establish that a person who commits a felony and kills another person
during the felony can be convicted of murder under the felony-murder
rule.66
Nonetheless, the states differ when the fact situation strays from the
common scenario where the felon unintentionally kills the victim. 67
Controversy arises when courts must decide the felon's criminal
liability for homicides committed by a party who is not the felon.68
Courts have used varying theories of liability to guide their
determination.69 Primarily, courts have utilized the following two
theories of liability in applying the felony-murder doctrine: the agency
theory7" of liability and the proximate cause theory7' of liability.72
felony-murder rule as either a theory of strict liability or transferred intent. See Roth &
Sundby, supra note 51, at 453-60. Under transferred intent, culpability for the homicide
is established by transferring the intent to commit the felony to the intent to commit
murder. See id. at 453-54. Conversely, strict liability justifies culpability through
establishing that someone committed a felony and a homicide occurred; no separate
mental state is necessary. See id. at 457. If a defendant committed a felony and a death
occurred, the defendant is strictly liable for the death because the defendant also
committed the felony. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 683 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Il1. App. Ct.
1997) (holding the felon liable for a homicide regardless of whether the killing was
reckless or accidental).
66. See Morris, supra note 32, at 59.
67. See Case Note, Criminal Law-Application of Felony Murder Rule Sustained
Where Robbery Victim Killed Defendant's Accomplice, 5 DEPAUL L. REV. 298, 302
(1956) [hereinafter, Application of Felony Murder Rule] (noting that jurisdictions
deviate when the situation is more complex than what is generally provided for in the
felony-murder statutes).
68. See Morris, supra note 32, at 59-61 (establishing that courts must address
whether felons are murderers due to their felonies irrespective of who killed the victim).
69. Compare Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (Md. 1982) (holding the
defendant not guilty under the felony-murder rule because the court applied the agency
theory of liability), with People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 665-66 (N.Y. 1993)
(utilizing the proximate cause theory of liability to hold the defendant guilty under the
felony-murder doctrine).
70. Agency is "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, at 7 (1957).
Courts define the agency theory of liability as, "not extend[ing] to a killing, although
growing out of the commission of the felony, if directly attributable to the act of one
other than the defendant or those associated with him in the unlawful enterprise." State
v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 23 (N.J. 1977); see also infra Part II.B.I.
7 1. The test for proximate cause is "that which determines an injury to be the
proximate result of negligence only where the injury is the natural or reasonable and
probable consequence of the wrongful act." 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 509, at 495
(1989). The courts describe the proximate cause theory of liability for the felony-murder
rules as, "any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity-notwithstanding
the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime." People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d
973, 975-76 (I11. 1997); see also infra Part II.B.2.
72. See State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 882-83 (Minn. 1992) (distinguishing the
two different theories of liability that can be applied in a felony-murder case).
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1. Agency Theory of Liability
A majority of the jurisdictions in the United States have endorsed
the agency theory of liability for felony-murder.73 Under the agency
theory, "the doctrine of felony-murder does not extend to a killing,
although growing out of the commission of the felony, if directly
attributable to the act of one other than the defendant or those
associated with him in the unlawful enterprise."74 For a person to be
responsible for the killing of another under the felony-murder doctrine,
the action must be actively or constructively his own.75 Therefore, the
defendant or a person acting in concert or advancing a common
purpose with the defendant must commit the act.76 Under the agency
theory, a felon is not liable when the felon's victim or a bystander
commits a homicide.77
States adopted the agency theory of liability to comport with the
basic rules of criminal responsibility.78 These rules generally limit a
person's responsibility to his own actions and the actions committed
by his agents in furtherance of a mutual criminal purpose.7 9
2. Proximate Cause Theory of Liability
Of the states that have adopted a specific felony-murder theory of
73. See, e.g., Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159, 161-62 (Del. 1980); State v. Garner,
115 So. 2d 855, 861-64 (La. 1959); Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Md.
1982); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308, 313 (Mass. 1965); State v. Rust,
250 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Neb. 1977); Clark County Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768
(Nev. 1973); Jackson v. State, 589 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1979); State v. Oxendine, 122 S.E.
568, 570 (N.C. 1924); State v. Jones, 859 P.2d 514, 515 (Okla. 1993); Commonwealth
v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 482-83 (Pa. 1958); State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935, 938
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 811, 816 (Va. 1981).
Georgia and Minnesota have both applied an agency approach without formally
adopting the agency theory of liability. See State v. Crane, 279 S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ga.
1981); Branson, 487 N.W.2d at 885.
74. Canola, 374 A.2d at 23 (examining the agency theory of liability for the felony-
murder doctrine).
75. See Garner, 115 So. 2d at 861.
76. See id. (establishing that a defendant cannot be responsible for a third party's
actions during the commission of a felony).
77. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965); Crane, 279
S.E.2d at 696; Commonwealth v. Moore, 88 S.W. 1085, 1087 (Ky. 1905); Campbell,
444 A.2d at 1042; Branson, 487 N.W.2d at 885; Hicks, 506 P.2d at 768; Jackson, 589
P.2d at 1053; Jones, 859 P.2d at 515; Redline, 137 A.2d at 482-83; Wooden, 284
S.E.2d at 816.
78. See Campbell, 444 A.2d at 1038 (examining why states adopt the agency theory
of liability for the felony-murder rule).
79. See id. The criminal justice system does not commonly extend liability for
criminal acts as far as tort liability extends. See id.
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liability,8 ° only a minority has applied the proximate cause theory of
liability.8" Under the proximate cause theory, liability attaches "for
any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity-even the
death of a co-felon-notwithstanding the killing was by one resisting
the crime."82 For liability to attach in proximate cause jurisdictions,
the homicide must be the proximate result of the felon's actions.83
States embrace the proximate cause theory of liability to ensure that
those who commit felonies that endanger human lives are held
responsible for any resulting deaths.84 To achieve this purpose, the
proximate cause theory for felony-murder attempts to function as a
reasonable extension of criminal liability. The courts that utilize the
proximate cause theory assert that a reasonable application of the
theory ensures that a felon is not liable for the superseding acts of a
third party.86 Thus, the courts conclude that the adoption of the
proximate cause theory does not create unlimited criminal liability
when applied to the felony-murder rule.87
80. Georgia and Minnesota have not explicitly adopted a theory of liability because
their felony-murder statutes clearly indicate how to apply the rule. See supra note 73.
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Ark. 1972) (holding that a
defendant or co-felon who used a victim as a shield to escape from a burglary can be
guilty of felony-murder even though the defendant or co-felon did not fire the fatal shot);
Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 2d 606, 608-09 (Fla. 1978) (defining felony-murder to
include the killing of a co-felon by a police officer); People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474,
475 (11. 1998) (applying the proximate cause theory of liability to determine that a
defendant can be guilty of murder when his co-felon is killed by the intended victim of
the crime); State v. Martin, 573 A.2d 1359, 1375 (N.J. 1980) (convicting the defendant
of felony-murder because the death was causally connected to the felony); People v.
Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. 1993) (affirming the conviction of the
defendants for the murder of a police officer who a fellow officer killed following the
defendant's attempted robbery); Miers v. State, 251 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App.
1952) (concluding that the defendant was responsible for the death of the victim who
accidentally shot himself during a brawl with the defendant); State v. Oimen, 516
N.W.2d 399, 401 (Wis. 1994) (holding the defendant guilty of felony-murder because he
proximately caused his co-felon's death).
82. State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 23 (N.J. 1977) (explaining the history and breadth
of the proximate cause theory of liability).
83. See Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d at 662. "[C]riminal liability will adhere only when
the felons' acts are a sufficiently direct cause of the death. When the intervening acts of
another party are supervening or unforeseeable, the necessary causal chain is broken,
and there is no liability for the felons." Id. at 665-66 (citations omitted); see also
DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 488.
84. See Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d at 666 (stating that it is of no consequence "[t]hat
other States choose more narrow approaches" when applying the felony-murder rule).
85. See id. at 665.
86. See id. at 665-66 (discussing that it is a question for the jury to determine if a
police officer that kills a person while attempting to stop a felony is a superseding
cause).
87. See id. at 665-66. Although the court does not seek to create unlimited liability,
368 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 30
C. Felony-Murder Doctrine in Illinois
Illinois, along with a minority of other states,88 espouses the
proximate cause theory of liability for felony-murder.89 In Illinois, if a
death is proximately caused by the felonious9" actions of the
defendant, then murder liability 91 attaches. 92 Most importantly, the
facts surrounding each felony must be considered closely, on a case-
by-case basis, to determine if the murder was a result of the
commission of the felony.93
1. Statutory Authority
The Illinois legislature first recognized the felony-murder rule in
1827. 94 In 1961, during the recodification of the Illinois Criminal
Code, the legislature discussed the elimination of the felony-murder
rule.9 The doctrine's firm establishment within the fabric of Illinois
criminal law, however, proved to be more powerful than any criticism
it concluded that "[more than civil tort liability must be established[.]" Id. at 665.
88. See supra note 81 (listing decisions in which the courts adopted the proximate
cause theory of liability for the felony-murder doctrine).
89. See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 975, 975-76 (Ill. 1997); see also infra Part
II.C.2 (discussing how the Illinois Supreme Court established the proximate cause
theory of liability for the felony-murder rule).
90. Felonious is "[a] technical word of law which means done with intent to commit
crime, i.e., criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 617 (6th ed. 1990).
91. See supra Part II.B.2 (defining the proximate cause theory of liability for the
felony-murder rule).
92. See Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 975-76. In Lowery, the defendant was in the course of
committing an armed robbery when a struggle ensued and the victim obtained the gun.
See id. at 975. The defendant ran from the scene of the crime. See id. When the victim
of the robbery attempted to shoot the fleeing defendant, the victim instead killed an
innocent bystander. See id. The court, applying the proximate cause theory of liability,
held the felon liable for the death of the bystander under the felony-murder doctrine. See
id. at 979.
93. See id. at 977-78. The time and place of the murder are not as relevant as whether
the commission of the actual felony caused the death. See id. at 978-79.
94. See Roger Joslin, Comment, Felony Murder in Illinois: Extension Beyond
Justification, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 158, 158 (1960). The law in 1827 provided, "where
such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act, which in its
consequences naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the
prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense shall be deemed and adjudged to be
murder." STATUTES OF ILLINOIS, Criminal Jurisprudence: Crimes and Penalties § 145, at
138 (Gross 1874).
95. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 Committee Comments of 1961, at 15 (West
1993). The Committee Comments to the first-degree murder statute acknowledged the
existing debate over abandoning the felony-murder doctrine. See id. at Committee
Comments of 1961, at 15.
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of the felony-murder rule.96 The Committee Comments 97 concluded
that due to the dangerous nature of forcible felonies, deaths resulting
from such actions should be categorized as murder without the
necessity of additional proof.98
The recodified Illinois Criminal Code of 196199 divided the offense
of first degree murder into the following three general classes: (1)
actual intent to kill; (2) acting with knowledge that the acts will or
probably will result in death or great bodily harm; and (3) felony-
murder.'00 The statute limited liability under the felony-murder
doctrine to deaths occurring during the commission of forcible
felonies." °0 As in most jurisdictions, the Illinois statute led to
96. See id. at Committee Comments of 1961, at 15.
97. In 1972, Charles H. Bowman revised the Committee Comments. See id. at
Committee Comments of 1961, at 8.
98. See id. at Committee Comments of 1961, at 15.
99. See Hoecker, supra note 49, at 687. In recodifying the felony-murder rule the
substance of the rule remained the same, only the form was altered. See id. The chief
draftsman of the 1961 recodification commented that the most sizeable change was the
"unified arrangement by article and section, and the direct, concise use of modern
language." Charles H. Bowman, The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, 50 ILL. B.J. 34, 36
(1961).
100. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 Committee Comments of 1961, at 15
(West 1993). The Illinois First Degree Murder Statute states:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first
degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or
another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or
another; or
(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second
degree murder.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (West 1996).
101. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996). Forcible felonies are
codified in Illinois as the following:
treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault,
robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated
kidnapping, kidnapping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or
permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves
the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-8 (West 1996). The Committee Comments to the statute
stated that the felony-murder doctrine should be restricted to forcible felonies because
the previous felony-murder statute attached liability too broadly. See 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 Committee Comments of 1961, at 15 (West 1993). The committee
limited the felonies applicable to the felony-murder doctrine by acknowledging the trend
in case law. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-I Committee Comments of 1961, at 12.
Most of the previous cases in which the felony-murder rule had been applied involved a
homicide that occurred during a forcible felony. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1
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predictable and satisfactory results where the defendant or one of his
co-felons perpetrated a felony and committed a homicide. 0 2 The
application of the felony-murder statute was more controversial,
however, in situations not explicitly covered by the statute, 0 3 such as
when a non-participant of the felony commits the homicide. 0 4 Such
instances forced the Illinois courts to reinterpret the statute to fit these
unique situations. 105
2. Common Law Development
While the statute codified the presence of the felony-murder rule, it
did not clearly guide the courts in its application.'0 6 Because the
statute is silent regarding situations where a person other than the felon
commits the homicide, the courts had to determine whether to apply
the felony-murder doctrine and which theory of liability should be
used to justify its application.0 7 Prior to Dekens, the Illinois Supreme
Court has decided whether the felony-murder statute applied in the
following situations: when an intended victim killed an innocent
bystander;'0 8 when either a co-felon or an intended victim killed
another intended victim;1°9 and when a police officer or a co-felon
killed another police officer." 0 In each case, the defendant's liability
was dependent on whether the court adopted the proximate cause or
agency theory of liability.'
Committee Comments of 1961, at 12. See, e.g., People v. Weber, 83 N.E.2d 297 (I11.
1938) (robbery); People v. Nixon, 20 N.E.2d 789 (I11. 1939) (burglary); People v.
Goldvarg, 178 N.E. 892 (I11. 1931) (arson).
102. See Joslin, supra note 94, at 158-59. See, e.g., People v. Nowak, 258 N.E.2d
313, 319 (I11. 1970) (deciding that an action by a defendant in furtherance of the felony
was imputed to all of the defendants that had the intent to commit the felony); People v.
Weber, 83 N.E.2d 297, 307-08 (Il. 1948) (holding that the defendant was guilty of
felony-murder when he shot and killed the victim of the felony during an armed robbery).
103. See Joslin, supra note 94, at 158-59.
104. See id. at 160.
105. See Case Note, Application of Felony Murder Rule, supra note 67, at 300-02.
106. See id. (recognizing the controversy surrounding the felony-murder doctrine in
Illinois). See generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (a)(3) (West 1996).
107. See Case Note, Application of Felony Murder Rule, supra note 67, at 298-99.
Applying the felony-murder rule is most difficult when a person not involved in
committing the crime killed the deceased. See Hoecker, supra note 49, at 691.
108. See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975 (I11. 1997) (holding the felony-
murder doctrine did apply); but see Butler v. People, 18 N.E. 338 (111. 1888) (holding the
felony-murder doctrine did not apply).
109. See People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539, 542-43 (Il1. 1935) (holding the felony-
murder doctrine did apply).
110. See People v. Allen, 309 N.E.2d 544, 549 (I11. 1974) (holding the felony-
murder doctrine did apply).
I 1. See Case Note, Application of Felony Murder Rule, supra note 67, at 299
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Initially, the Illinois Supreme Court implicitly adopted the agency
theory of liability." 12 The court held that if a person, not a party to the
criminal conspiracy, committed the homicide the felon could not be
held responsible under the felony-murder rule. 3 For criminal liability
to attach, the act must have been performed by the actor's own "hand"
or by another person acting in support of a common intent to commit
the felony. 4
Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court constructively overruled
the agency theory of liability through the adoption of the proximate
cause theory of liability." 5 The court applied the proximate cause
theory to a situation in which either an intended victim or co-felon
killed the victim. 116 As long as the death was a reasonable and natural
(establishing that the courts' options were based either on the agency theory of liability
or on the proximate cause theory of liability).
11 12. See Butler, 18 N.E. at 339-340. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that "[iut
would be a strange rule of law, indeed, to hold a man liable for a crime which he did not
commit, which he did not advise, and which was committed without his knowledge or
assent, express or implied[." Id. at 340; see also supra note 70 (defining agency and
the agency theory of liability).
1 13. See Butler, 18 N.E. at 339-40. In Butler, a marshal was attempting to arrest a
member of a group that was disturbing the peace in a crowd. See id. at 338. While
attempting to make the arrest, another member of the group attacked the marshal. See
id. The marshal was knocked to the ground and was suppressed. See id. While
bystanders stopped the fight, the marshal's gun discharged and killed an innocent
person in the crowd. See id. Subsequently, the man who attacked the marshal was
charged with felony-murder because a death occurred while the defendant was committing
a felony (unlawful battery). See id. at 338-39. The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
reversed the defendant's conviction. See id. at 340.
1 14. See id. at 339. The defendant could not be held liable under the felony-murder
doctrine because there was no existing relationship between the marshal and the
defendant to act in concert to commit a felony. See id. The defendant and the marshal
were enemies not accomplices. See id. The defendant did not consent to the marshal
killing the victim nor did they conspire to act together. See id. at 339-40.
115. See Joslin, supra note 94, at 159-60. The Illinois Supreme Court decided People
v. Payne thirty-seven years after deciding Butler; however, the Payne decision did not
mention the precedent that the Illinois Supreme Court established in Butler. See id. at
160; see also People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539, 543 (I1. 1935) (ignoring the prior
adoption of the agency theory of liability by the Illinois Supreme Court).
116. See Payne, 194 N.E. at 543. In Payne, the defendant and a group of friends
conspired to rob the victim and his brother. See id. at 540-41. The defendant did not
physically participate in the actual robbery; however, during the robbery, the
accomplices became involved in a firearms altercation with the victims. See id. at 541.
One of the victims was killed, although it could not be determined if he was killed by a
felon, the other victim, or himself. See id. at 543. Despite not being present at the
robbery, the defendant was guilty of murder because he conspired to commit the felony,
and the actions of the co-felons were imputed to him. See id. at 540-43. Prior to the
Illinois Supreme Court decision, the circuit court in a jury trial also applied the
proximate cause theory of liability and found the defendant guilty of felony-murder. See
id. at 540.
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consequence of the felony, a court could hold a felon liable for the
death of an intended victim regardless of how the victim was killed." 7
Because the felons could have reasonably anticipated that their
felonious actions might be met with resistance by the intended
victims,"' the death that ensued from the victim's intervention was a
probable result of the felons' actions." 9
Under the proximate cause theory of liability, the Illinois Supreme
Court later extended the application of the felony-murder rule, holding
a felon liable for the death of a police officer who was killed by either a
fellow officer or a co-felon.12 0 The expansion of the felony-murder
rule to a scenario in which possibly neither the victim nor co-felon
committed the murder required reliance on the proximate cause theory
of liability.' 2 ' To justify the use of the theory, the Illinois Supreme
Court cited legislative intent, 122 referring specifically to the Committee
Comments that accompanied the recodification of the felony-murder
statute as advocating the proximate cause theory. 23 In doing so, the
court implicitly continued to hold that any death that is a direct and
117. See id. at 543. Irrespective of whether a co-felon or an intended victim of the
felony caused the death, the felon was held liable under the felony-murder rule. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 543. The court held that the felons could have reasonably foreseen the
death of the intended victim because it was within the scope of the natural and probable
consequences of the felony. See id.
120. See People v. Allen, 309 N.E.2d 544, 549 (Ill. 1974). In Allen, the felons
attempted to commit a robbery and entered into a gun battle with police officers. See id.
at 545. One of the police officers was shot and later died from the wounds he sustained.
See id. It could not be fully determined if one of the other police officers or a felon shot
the bullet that killed the victim. See id. at 546. Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court
determined that liability attached under the felony-murder doctrine, regardless of who
fired the fatal shot. See id.
121. See id. at 545.
122. See id. at 548-49. The Allen court referred to the following Committee
Comments that accompanied the Illinois murder statute:
The felony-murder class is represented by a number of cases, but none has been
found in which the offense which was being perpetrated was other than a
forcible felony. (E.g. robbery; burglary; arson). It is immaterial whether the
killing in such a case is intentional or accidental, or is committed by a
confederate without the connivance of the defendant . . . or even by a third
person trying to prevent the commission of the felony.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 Committee Comments of 1961, at 12-13 (West 1993)
(citing People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 359 (1935)). Thus, the court reasoned that the
citation to Payne in the Committee Comments indicated that the legislature intended the
felony-murder statute to incorporate Payne. See Allen, 309 N.E.2d at 548.
123. See Allen, 309 N.E.2d at 548-49. Allen reached its conclusion on the basis of
the holding in Payne. See Paul M. Van Arsdell, Jr., Illinois Supreme Court Review
1974-75: Felony Murder Statute Construed, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 204, 207. As in Payne,
the defendant was liable for the death of the police officer regardless of whether a co-
felon or a police officer fired the shot. See Allen, 309 N.E.2d at 548-49.
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reasonable consequence of the felon's actions is within the scope of
the felony-murder rule.
24
In a subsequent case, the Illinois Supreme Court appeared to limit
the application of the felony-murder rule by interpreting the felony-
murder statute as only extending liability to instances where the
decedent is an innocent person. 25 In People v. Hickman, the appellate
court found the felon responsible under the felony-murder rule when a
police officer mistakenly killed another police officer in pursuit of a
felon. 126 The appellate court appeared to limit the scope of the felony-
murder rule by interpreting the proximate cause theory of liability 127 to
mean that "he whose act causes in any way, directly or indirectly, the
death of an innocent victim is guilty of murder by virtue of the felony-
murder doctrine."'' 28 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the appellate
court's finding and declared that the description of the felony-murder
rule by the appellate court was correct. 29  The court was unclear,
however, as to whether this declaration was a rule of general
application in felony-murder cases or simply a holding limited to the
facts of the case.130
124. See Allen, 309 N.E.2d at 548-49 (expanding the holding of Payne by applying
the felony-murder rule to cases in which either a felon or a police officer kills the
victim).
125. See People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 514 (I11. 1974) (holding that the
appellate court in Hickman correctly interpreted the felony-murder rule). The Illinois
Supreme Court decided Hickman eight months after deciding Allen.
126. See People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In Hickman,
as opposed to Allen, it was undisputed that the police officer was shot and killed by a
fellow police officer. See id. at 583.
127. The Illinois Supreme Court implicitly adopted the proximate cause theory of
liability. See People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539, 543 (I11. 1935); see also supra notes 115-
19 and accompanying text (discussing Payne).
128. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d at 586 (interpreting Payne). In establishing the
applicable definition of the proximate cause theory of liability, the appellate court
specifically considered and distinguished the appellate court decision in People v.
Morris, 274 N.E.2d 898 (11. App. Ct. 1971). See id. at 585-86. In Morris, a third party
committed the homicide, but the defendant was not guilty of felony-murder because the
third party's acts were not done in furtherance of the plan to commit the felony. See
Morris, 274 N.E.2d at 901. Therefore, the Hickman court concluded that the guilt or
innocence of the party that was killed during the commission of a felony was integral to
the liability that would be attached under the proximate cause theory of liability. See
Hickman, 297 N.E.2d at 585-86.
129. See Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 514 (holding that the "appellate court correctly
interpreted the felony-murder statute"). The Illinois Supreme Court also explained the
appellate court's application of direct and foreseeable consequences as the following: "It
is unimportant that the defendant did not anticipate the precise sequence of events that
followed. His unlawful acts precipitated those events, and he is responsible for the
consequences." Id. at 513 (quoting People v. Smith, 307 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Il1. 1974)).
130. See id. at 514.
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In 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court faced the same fact scenario in
which it originally adopted the agency theory of liability over 100
years earlier. 131 This time, however, the court affirmed the application
of the proximate cause theory of liability under the felony-murder
doctrine. ' As in the earlier case, the intended victim killed an
innocent party during the commission of a felony. 133 The defendant
requested that the court reassess the theory of liability previously
applied in the cases involving the felony-murder doctrine.134 Citing
public policy,135 the language of the Illinois felony-murder statute, 136
and legislative intent, 137 the court reaffirmed the proximate cause
theory of liability. 138  The court concluded that the killing of an
innocent person by an intended victim of the felony could not be
masked as an intervening cause or coincidence, and thus the felony-
murder doctrine still applied. 139
13 1. Compare People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973 (I11. 1997) with Butler v. People,
18 N.E. 338, 339-340 (Ill. 1888) (holding that a defendant could not be held liable under
the felony-murder doctrine when there was no relationship between the person
responsible for the homicide and the defendant).
132. See Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976.
133. See id. at 975. After struggling with the intended victim of the armed robbery,
the defendant in Lowery fled from the scene of the crime. See id. The intended victim
of the robbery obtained the defendant's gun and proceeded to shoot at the fleeing
defendant. See id. The intended victim, however, shot and killed a passing woman
instead of the defendant. See id.
134. See id. at 975-77. The court analyzed both theories of liability and assessed the
previous Illinois Supreme Court decisions in which it had applied the proximate cause
theory of liability. See id. (citing People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539,543; People v. Allen,
309 N.E.2d 544, 548-49 (Ill. 1974); Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 514).
135. See Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976. The court reasoned that it was consistent with
public policy to apply the doctrine of proximate cause to civil and criminal cases. See
id. In upholding the doctrine, the court reasoned that the "[clausal relation is the
universal factor common to all legal liability .... [Tihe individual who unlawfully sets
in motion a chain of events which in the natural order of things results in damages to
another is held to be responsible for it." Id.
136. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (West 1996); see also Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at
976 (construing the language of the Illinois felony-murder statute). The Lowery court
did not justify how the language of the Illinois felony-murder statute explicitly
demonstrated a proximate cause theory of liability. See Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 977.
Rather, the court arrived at the proximate theory by noting that of the two possible
theories, "[w]e fail to see how the plain language of the statute demonstrates legislative
intent to follow the agency theory." See id.; see supra note 100 (quoting the language of
the statute).
137. See Lowery , 687 N.E.2d at 977; see also supra note 122 (citing the Committee
Comments utilized by the Lowery court to justify the proximate cause theory of liability
for the felony-murder rule).
138. See Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976-77 (affirming that Illinois should not adopt the
agency theory of liability for felony-murder).
139. See id. at 978. Notably, the court did not recognize what it would consider to be
an intervening cause in a felony-murder situation. See id. The court merely stated that
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III. DISCUSSION
On April 16, 1998, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v.
Dekens. 4 ° In a four to three decision,"' the court held that the felony-
murder rule applied without regard to who killed the victim or the
culpability of the deceased. 4 ' Presented with a case of first
impression, the court decided that the felony-murder rule attached
liability to the defendant when the intended victim killed the co-
felon.
143
A. Background of People v. Dekens
On January 5, 1996, the defendant arranged to sell drugs to an
undercover policeman. 144 The defendant and the decedent, Peter
Pecchenino, planned to rob the police officer. 45 At the exchange, the
defendant approached the police officer with a gun. 46 In response,
the police officer discharged several shots from his own gun. 147
Pecchenino was struck by the police officer's shots and died.
48
Subsequently, the defendant was charged with Pecchenino's murder,
criminal drug conspiracy, and attempted armed robbery. 14
B. Lower Court Decisions
Relying on an earlier appellate court decision, 50 the trial court judge
the intended victim's "resistance was in direct response to defendant's criminal acts and
did not break the causal chain between defendant's acts and decedent's death." Id.
140. People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1998).
141. Justice Miller wrote the opinion joined by Chief Justice Freeman, and Justices
Harrison and Nickels. See id. at 474-78. Justices Bilandic, McMorrow, and Heiple
dissented. See id. at 478-81 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) and (Heiple, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 477.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 475. The defendant's name was Cody Dekens, and the sale was
arranged to take place at a residence in Kankakee County. See id.
145. See id. (stating that the defendant and decedent arranged to commit the robbery
at the narcotics sale).
146. See id. The defendant threatened the undercover police officer with his gun. See
id.
147. See id. The police officer drew his gun as a result of the defendant's threats. See
id. The police officer attempted to leave the house but was unable to retreat because
Pecchenino grabbed him. See id.
148. See id. (establishing that the decedent died from wounds sustained by the police
officer's shots).
149. See id. (charging the defendant under the felony-murder statute for Pecchenino's
death).
150. See People v. Morris, 274 N.E.2d 898, 901 (I11. App. Ct. 1971) (overruled by
People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474 (111. 1998)). In Morris, the defendant and two co-
felons went into a restaurant to rob the customers. See id. at 900. During the robbery, a
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dismissed the defendant's felony-murder charge.'51 The trial court
determined that felony-murder was only applicable when the death
occurred as a result of an action that furthered the felony." 2 The trial
court found that the police officer's action of shooting the co-felon did
not further the defendant's goal of committing an armed robbery." 3
The appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the felony-
murder charge.' 54 The appellate court's decision, however, centered
on a different analysis than that of the trial court.'55 The appellate
court held that the felony-murder rule was only applicable when the
person murdered was an innocent victim. 15 6 Therefore, the defendant
was not liable under the felony-murder rule because a co-felon was
killed as opposed to an innocent victim. '
C. The Majority's Application of the Proximate Cause Theory
The Illinois Supreme Court overturned' 58 the lower courts'
decisions by a one Justice majority. 5 9 In reviewing the felony-murder
rule, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that none of the previous
Illinois Supreme Court felony-murder cases specifically addressed the
situation where the deceased individual was a party to the crime. 160
customer entered the restaurant. See id. One of the co-felons struggled with the customer
because he would not hand over his wrist watch to the felons. See id. While the struggle
ensued, three shots were fired from the co-felons gun. See id. The co-felon was shot and
killed. See id. The defendant was tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook
County for the murder of his co-felon under the felony-murder statute. See id. at 899. On
appeal, the Appellate Court in the First District of Illinois overturned the ruling of the
circuit court. See id. at 901.
15 1. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 475.
152. See id. In Morris, the court held that when the co-felon struggled with an
innocent customer, the act was not done in furtherance of the commission of the felony.
See Morris, 274 N.E.2d at 901. Therefore, the requirements of the felony-murder
doctrine were not satisfied and the surviving felon was not guilty of murder. See id.
153. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 475. The State appealed the trial court's decision.
See id.
154. See id. The appellate court decision was unpublished. See id.
155. See id. (concluding that the appellate court reached the same conclusion as the
trial court but for different reasons).
156. See id. (acknowledging the appellate court's position that the decedent's
involvement in the crime was pertinent when determining if liability extended to the
defendant under the felony-murder doctrine).
157. See id. (pointing to the appellate court's rationale that the felony-murder
doctrine was intended to protect innocent victims and was not intended to protect
decedents that were accessories to the felony).
158. See id. (granting the State's petition for appeal).
159. See id.
160. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 475-77 (establishing Dekens as a case of first
impression). The court summarized and assessed the applicability of prior Illinois
Supreme Court decisions regarding the felony-murder rule and compared the cases to the
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The court concluded, however, that the outcome of the previous cases
prompted the application of the felony-murder rule in Dekens.16'
As a threshold matter, the court determined that the proximate cause
theory of liability should apply in Illinois. 162 In doing so, the court let
the principles of public policy, articulated in a prior Illinois Supreme
Court decision, 163 determine whether the defendant should be
responsible for any death that was a proximate result of the
defendant's felonious actions. 164 Having established the use of the
proximate cause theory, the court framed the issue as whether the
defendant's felony was the direct and proximate cause of the co-
felon's death. 1
65
Noting that the felony-murder doctrine is applicable when an
intended victim of the felony kills an innocent third party, 6 6 the court
found that the logical progression of the felony-murder doctrine would
include an intended victim killing a guilty party that participated in the
felony.167 The court stated that the decedent's actions and involvement
in the felony should not displace the defendant's responsibility for the
homicide. 168  According to the court's reasoning, the focus of the
facts in Dekens. See id. The cases the court surveyed were the following: People v.
Payne, 194 N.E.2d 539 (111. 1935), People v. Allen, 309 N.E.2d 544 (I11. 1974), People
v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511 (I11. 1974) and People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973 (Ill.
1997). See id.; see also supra Part II.C (discussing evolution of the felony-murder rule in
Illinois).
16 1. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 477 (stating that the court had previously considered
adopting the agency theory, instead of the proximate cause theory, but did not do so).
162. See id. at 476-77. The court began its determination with an examination of the
progression of the felony-murder rule from the Payne decision in 1935 to the Lowery
decision in 1997. See id.; see also supra Part II.C (tracing the development of proximate
cause liability for felony-murder in Illinois).
163. See id. at 476-77 (citing Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 977). Quoting Lowery, the
court highlighted the following passage:
It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when
a felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events
which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion
was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and
almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.
Id. at 476 (citing Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976).
164. See id. at 477 (holding that "death proximately related to the defendant's
criminal conduct" was actionable under the felony-murder doctrine in Illinois).
165. See id. at 695 N.E.2d at 477 (holding that the guilt or innocence of the deceased
person was irrelevant in determining liability under the proximate cause theory of
liability for felony-murder).
166. See id. (citing Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 977-78).
167. See id.
168. See id. The court stated, "[wle do not believe that the defendant should be
relieved from liability for the homicide simply because of the decedent's role in the
offense." Id.
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felony-murder doctrine was to assess the defendant's actions-not the
guilt or innocence of the deceased. 169  The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant could be charged under the proximate
cause theory of felony-murder for the killing of a co-felon by an
intended victim of the felony. 170
Relying on the Illinois Supreme Court's earlier, apparent acceptance
of the proposition that the rule could only apply if the decedent were
innocent,'7' the defendant argued that the felony-murder rule could not
apply if the decedent were a co-felon.172  Although the Illinois
Supreme Court consented to the Hickman court's approach, the Court
only found it to be applicable to the specific holding of that case.
173
The Hickman court's discussion of the limitations regarding the guilt
or innocence of the deceased when applying the felony-murder rule
was dicta and not the holding endorsed by the Illinois Supreme
Court. 174
The defendant further argued that the Illinois Supreme Court's
application of the felony-murder doctrine was incompatible with the
true purpose of the felony-murder doctrine. 175 After examining the
169. See id. at 477-78 (stating that if the court considered the guilt or innocence of
the deceased, the analysis would diverge from the proximate cause theory of liability).
The court remarked, "[n]or do we believe that application of the [felony-murder] doctrine
depends on whether or not the decedent was an innocent party. To hold otherwise would
import the agency theory of felony-murder into our law." Id. at 477.
170. See id. at 477 (concluding that a felon is criminally liable for the death of a co-
felon during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony).
171. See id. (citing People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582, 585-86 (Ill. App. Ct.
1973)). The appellate court in Hickman, held that the defendant could be liable for the
death of a police officer killed by a fellow police officer under the felony-murder rule.
See Hickman, 297 N.E.2d at 585-86. In its holding, the Hickman court distinguished
People v. Morris, 274 N.E.2d 898 (111. App. Ct. 1971) because Hickman dealt with an
innocent victim whereas the deceased in Morris was a felon. See Hickman, 297 N.E.2d
at 585. The defendant in Morris could not be liable for felony-murder because the
deceased contributed to the actions that were the proximate cause of his own death. See
id. at 586. In Hickman , however, an innocent party was killed during the commission
of a felony; thus, the felony-murder doctrine was applicable. See id.; see also supra
notes 125-30 and accompanying text (discussing Hickman).
172. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 477-78.
173. See id. at 477. The court explained that the holding in Hickman "should be
understood as extending only to the issue actually decided-whether the defendant in that
case was liable for murder when the decedent was a police officer who had been shot and
killed by another officer." Id. (emphasis added).
174. See id. (stating that the defendant's argument to solely limit the felony-murder
rule to innocent victims was "unpersuasive"); see also supra note 130 and accompanying
text (discussing the lack of clarity in Hickman).
175. See id. at 478 (pointing to defendant's claim that the purpose of the felony-
murder doctrine was to protect innocent people from becoming the victims of unintended
deaths during felonies).
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Committee Comments, 7 6 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's argument.'77 The court held that the legislative intent
espousing the proximate cause theory would be frustrated if the
defendant was not responsible for the death of a co-felon.'78 The
proximate cause theory imposes liability on a defendant for any deaths
that were a proximate result of the defendant's felonious actions.79
Thus, the court found that allowing a defendant to escape
responsibility when the decedent is a co-felon conflicts with this theory
and the legislature's intent. 80
D. Dissenting Opinion Advocating a Limited Proximate Cause
Theory
Justice Bilandic, in his dissent, asserted that the proximate cause
theory did not compel the majority's result.' 8' He criticized the
majority for not explaining how its holding furthered the intent of the
felony-murder doctrine.'82 Instead of asking whether the result
comported with the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine, the
majority only inquired as to whether the defendant's actions in
committing a felony proximately caused the death of the co-felon.' 83
The dissent also found fault with the majority's determination of
proximate cause. 184 Justice Bilandic asserted that the proximate cause
of the co-felon's death was the involvement of the co-felon himself in
the felony. 8 The co-felon's actions resulted more directly in his own
176. See supra note 95-99, 101, 122 and accompanying text (discussing 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 and the corresponding Committee Comments of 1961).
177. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 478 (examining the Committee Comments to the
section in the Illinois Criminal Code that codified the felony-murder rule).
178. See id. (holding that "denying liability when the decedent is a co-felon would
conflict with the legislature's adoption of the proximate cause theory"). The Illinois
Supreme Court then remanded the case to the circuit court of Kankakee County for further
proceedings. See id.
179. See id. at 477.
180. See id. at 478 (establishing that felons should be held responsible for all
actions that are a proximate result of the felony).
181. See id. at 478-79 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for treating
Dekens like a tort liability case as opposed to a criminal case); supra note 135
(examining how the court in Lowery applied the proximate cause theory of liability to
both criminal and civil cases).
182. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 479 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
183. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority did not ask the
correct question and thereby did not reach the true issue of the case).
184. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
185. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (stating that, as such, the defendant was not the
proximate cause of the co-felon's death).
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death than did the defendant's actions.186 The dissent reasoned that the
degree of guilt attached to a defendant when an innocent party is killed
during a felony is not the same as when a person actively participating
in the felony is killed.'87 Justice Bilandic clearly disapproved of the
majority's holding because it did not comport with his notions of
justice inherent in the adoption of the felony-murder doctrine. 88
Furthermore, Justice Bilandic found the majority opinion to have an
unsubstantiated foundation in Illinois legislative and judicial law.'89
First, Justice Bilandic maintained that previous Illinois Supreme Court
decisions did not dictate the outcome the majority asserted.' 90 The
majority conceded that none of the prior cases addressed the exact
issue presented in Dekens.'9' Therefore, the dissent argued that the
prior cases did not logically lead to the majority's conclusion that the
felony-murder doctrine was applicable in a situation where a co-felon
was killed. 92 Second, the dissent claimed that the majority unfairly
relied on the Committee Comments.' 93 The dissent contended that the
Committee Comments did not address the issue that was before the
court in Dekens and therefore could not adequately support the
majority's conclusion.' 94
186. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (explaining that the decedent assisted in
planning the crime during which he was eventually killed).
187. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's logic in holding the
defendant liable for the death of a person that actively and willingly participated in the
crime).
1 88. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Justice Bilandic contended that the majority
frustrated the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine because "the ramifications of the
felony-murder doctrine are harsh; a defendant who, it is conceded, intended only to
commit a far less serious offense than murder is nonetheless made guilty of first degree
murder." Id. at 478 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 479-80 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 479 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Justice Bilandic stated that these cases,
cited by the majority as clearly supporting its holding, in fact "say nothing of the sort."
Id. None of these cases, according to Justice Bilandic, considered the issue of whether
the application of the felony-murder rule applied to the death of a co-felon. See id.
Distinguishing the Lowery decision, Justice Bilandic noted that the issue there was
instead over the killing of an innocent bystander, not a co-felon. See id.
191. See id. at 476. The majority stated the Illinois Supreme Court had "never
addressed the precise question raised" in the Dekens case. See id.; see also supra note
160 (listing the felony-murder rule cases that the majority discussed).
192. See id. at 479 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (finding no prior precedent for the
majority's decision).
193. See id. at 480 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
194. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Justice Bilandic stated that the Committee
Comments only concluded that it was irrelevant whether a felon or a third person
attempting to stop the felony killed the decedent. See id.; see also supra note 122
(quoting the Committee Comments).
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The dissent proposed following the original purpose of the felony-
murder doctrine.' 95 They concluded that the felony-murder doctrine
created liability for murder during a felony even when there was no
intent to kill. 96  Intent is not necessary because when a person
commits a forcible felony, the probability that death will occur is an
"inherent danger." 97 The dissent argued that the felony-murder rule
protects innocent people from the inherent danger of a felony. 98
Thus, Justice Bilandic emphasized that the felony-murder rule did not
purport to protect felons that were involved in the commission of a
crime.199
In conclusion, the dissent stated that the majority would have
reached a different holding if it followed traditional notions of fairness
and justice. °0 The dissent criticized the majority for achieving a result
wholly opposed to the intent of the doctrine.20 '
E. Dissenting Opinion Advocating an Agency Theory of Liability
Justice Heiple authored a separate dissenting opinion even more
critical of the majority than Justice Bilandic's opinion.2"2 Justice
Heiple's dissent advocated that a just interpretation of the felony-
murder rule mandates the adoption of an agency theory of liability.0 3
Justice Heiple asserted that the majority's application of the felony-
murder doctrine wrongly displaces the intent requirement that is
necessary for convictions under other types of first-degree murder.20 4
195. See id. at 478 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[g]iven the harsh
consequences of the felony-murder doctrine, I [Justice Bilandic] believe that it should be
limited to those situations in which its application achieves the purpose underlying the
rule").
196. See id. at 478 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (exemplifying the harsh results of the
felony-murder doctrine).
197. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 977
(I1. 1997)).
198. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (citing Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 977) (stating
that the legislature was concerned with "protecting the general populace").
199. See id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that majority's extension of the
felony-murder doctrine "dilute[d] the justification for the felony-murder doctrine").
200. See id. at 480 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 478-80 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority did not
achieve justice because it misapplied the felony-murder doctrine).
202. See id. at 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
203. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Heiple joined in a
previous Illinois Supreme Court opinion that upheld the use of the proximate cause
theory for felony-murder. See State v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 977 (I11. 1997). Justice
Heiple stated in Dekens, however, "I have changed my view of the matter."
Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J. dissenting).
204. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see supra note 100
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Thus, Justice Heiple maintained that a court applies the doctrine
correctly only when a defendant is held responsible for a death that
resulted from the defendant's actions during the felony.2" 5
Accordingly, Justice Heiple rejected the application of the felony-
murder doctrine when the defendant, or someone acting in concert
with the defendant, does not directly perform the actions that result in
the victim's death.2 °6
In supporting the adoption of the agency theory, Justice Heiple
relied on the language of the Illinois felony-murder statute.2"7 The
language in the statute does not state that a felon is liable for the acts of
a third party during the commission of the felony.20 8 Justice Heiple
asserted that the felon must personally cause the death by "performing
the acts which cause[d] the death.
' 21
Finally, Justice Heiple dismissed the majority's use of the
Committee Comments. 2 '0 Although the Committee Comments directly
supported the application of the proximate cause theory of liability,2 1
Justice Heiple did not find the Committee Comments to be controlling
because the committee only supported its findings with one Illinois
Supreme Court case.21 2 Justice Heiple asserted that the Committee
Comments were nonlegislative and no evidence existed to show how
the legislature intended to apply the felony-murder doctrine in
Illinois. 213  In conclusion, Justice Heiple maintained that justice
(quoting Illinois' first degree murder statute); see supra note 35 and accompanying text
(explaining why there is not a required mental state for felony-murder). Justice Heiple
began his dissent with a brief overview of the development of the felony-murder
doctrine. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting); supra Part II.A
(discussing the origins of felony-murder and how it developed).
205. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
206. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (finding that if a third party committed the
homicide the felon should not be held responsible under the felony-murder rule).
207. See id. at 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1
(West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (requiring a person to "perform the acts which cause death").
208. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see also 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.
209. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (quoting 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/9-1).
210. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting). The majority discussed how the Committee
Comments supported their holding. See id. at 478; supra notes 95-99, 101, 122 and
accompanying text (discussing the Committee Comments in relation to the
development of the felony-murder doctrine in Illinois).
211. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1
Committee Comments of 1961, at 12-13 (West 1993)).
212. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Justice Heiple noted
that the committee only cited to the holding in People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539 (1935).
See id. (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 Committee Comments of 1961 at 16).
213. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
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required Illinois to adopt the agency theory of liability in felony-
murder cases." 4
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority in Dekens asserted that the purpose of the felony-
murder doctrine is to hold the defendant liable for any deaths that
proximately result from the commission of a felony.2 5 In interpreting
felony-murder so broadly, the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in
Dekens directly conflicts with the original intent of the doctrine.216
The court expanded the applicability of the felony-murder rule so that
intent can be transferred not only from a different felony, 2 7 but also
from a different person.218 Furthermore, the court failed to explain
how the expansion of the felony-murder doctrine would provide an
additional deterrent to crime.219 In adopting an expanded felony-
murder rule, the court improperly relied upon legislative comments
rather than the plain meaning of the statute, which suggests an agency
theory of liability-a theory that is a "reasonable and just interpretation
of the law. 22°
A. Purpose of the Felony-Murder Doctrine
The majority incorrectly asserted that the purpose of the felony-
murder doctrine is to impose liability on a defendant for all deaths that
proximately result from the defendant's felony. 22' The court
determined that felons must be liable for all of the foreseeable
consequences of their crimes.12' According to the majority, if felons
are not held responsible for the proximate results of their actions, then
214. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
2 15. See id. at 476-77 (adopting the proximate cause theory of liability).
216. See id. at 478, 480 (Bilandic, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.A. I (noting
that the majority's decision extends the felony-murder doctrine beyond its original
purpose).
217. See supra note 35 (explaining how the law transfers the intent to commit a
felony to the intent to commit a murder).
218. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 478. The effect of the expansion of the felony-
murder rule is to enable intent to be transferred from a different person without the proof
of that intent. The court did not explain why the expansion was necessary. See id.
219. See id. at 474-79 (failing to establish how the holding of the Dekens case
would deter future felonious conduct).
220. Id. at 481.
22 1. See id. at 476-77. The majority stated that "the intent [of the felony-murder
rule] would be thwarted if we [Justices] did not hold felons responsible for the
foreseeable consequences of their actions." Id. at 477.
222. See id. (establishing that the defendant's liability should not be discharged due
to the guilt of the decedent).
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the intent of the felony-murder rule is frustrated." 3 The felony-murder
rule, however, has two major purposes: (1) to impose liability on a
felon for an unintended homicide committed by the felon or someone
working in concert with the felon during a felony224 and (2) to deter a
person from committing a felony because of the liability that is attaches
if a homicide occurs during the felony.225
1. Purpose of the Felony-Murder Doctrine at Inception
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, the purpose of the
doctrine is not furthered if a defendant is punished for a homicide that
a victim of the felony committed.226 The felony-murder doctrine was
implemented to hold felons responsible for an unintended death of
their victims. 22 7 Therefore, the felony-murder rule should be confined
to the traditional common law boundaries it has always maintained. 28
The felony-murder doctrine, established in England, created liability
for any unintended homicides that occurred in conjunction with a
defendant's felony. 229  Later development of the felony-murder
doctrine in England230 established that the doctrine was not intended to
hold the defendant responsible for acts that were attributable to
others.231 The scholars who discussed the felony-murder rule focused
their attention on instances where either the felon or co-felon actually
committed the homicide.232 In addition, the English court system
223. See id. (citing State v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill. 1997)).
224. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the origins of the felony-murder doctrine as a
means to hold felons accountable for accidental deaths which occur during the
commission of the felony).
225. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the deterrent functions of the felony-murder
doctrine).
226. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (holding that for a
felon to be guilty of murder under the felony-murder rule, the act of killing must be
committed by the defendant or by his accomplice).
227. See Comment, Felons Can Be Held Responsible under the New Jersey Murder
Statute for the Death of an Innocent Party Killed by Police Attempting to Apprehend the
Felons, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 591, 600-01 (1970) [hereinafter Comment, New Jersey
Murder Statute].
228. See Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. D.N. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (Pa.
1970) (finding that the defendant was not guilty under the felony-murder rule when a
police officer killed an off-duty police officer in the pursuit of the felon).
229. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 206-08; see also supra Part II.
(discussing the background of the felony-murder rule).
230. See supra Part II.A.2 (tracing the history of the felony-murder doctrine in
England).
231. See Comment, New Jersey Murder Statute, supra note 227, at 600
(acknowledging that the felony-murder rule had a limited application in England).
232. See id. (mentioning Lord Coke, Blackstone, Judge Stephen, and Justice
Holmes). Lord Coke's formulation of felony-murder was the following:
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narrowly applied the felony-murder rule.23 3 The traditional common
law only extended liability under the felony-murder rule when the
defendant or a person acting in concert committed the homicide.234
Therefore, convicting a felon for the actions of a third party extends
liability further than was originally contemplated by early scholars of
the felony-murder rule.23 5 Thus, holding the defendant in Dekens res-
ponsible for the death of a person killed by a third party, clearly
departs from the original intent of the felony-murder doctrine and is
unjust."'
The felony-murder rule originated as a type of murder without any
required mental state.237 Instead of a required mental state, the felon's
intent to commit the specific felony satisfies the intent necessary to
commit the actual homicide. 238  The doctrine of transferred intent
If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A meaning to steal a Deer in the Park
of B. Shooteth at the Deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy, that
is hidden in a bush: this is murder, for that the act was unlawful, although A
had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him. But if B the owner of the
Park had shot at his own Deer, and without any ill intent had killed the Boy by
the glance of his arrow, this had been Homicide by misadventure, and no
felony.
E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (1648).
Blackstone's definition of felony-murder was, "if one intends to do another felony, and
undesignedly kills a man, this is also murder." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *200-
01. Holmes determined liability under felony-murder when "a man does an act with
intent to commit a felony, and thereby accidentally kills another; for instance, if he
fires at chickens, intending to steal them, and accidentally kills the owner, whom he
does not see." OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963).
233. See Sidney Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the
Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 624, 634 (1957) (noting that the English court
system developed the felony-murder doctrine).
234. See id. English common law only extended liability when an accomplice
committed the homicide during the commission of a felony. See id. (citing Rex v. Betts,
22 Crim. App. R. 148 (1930) and Regina v. Grant, 38 Crim. App. F. 107 (1954)).
235. See Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (Md. 1982) (holding that the
proximate cause theory of liability extended beyond the traditional common law
application of the felony-murder rule).
236. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 7.5, at 218 (reasoning that "it is not
justice (though it may be poetic justice) to hold the felon liable for murder on account of
the death, which the felon did not intend, of a co-felon willingly participating in the
risky venture").
237. See People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474, 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that felony-murder is the only type of first degree murder in Illinois that
does not mandate a mental state to obtain a conviction); supra notes 204-06 and
accompanying text (explaining Justice Heiple's reasoning regarding the intent
requirement); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996).
238. See TORCIA, supra note 8, § 147, at 296-97 (explaining that the mental state for
the homicide is supplied by the mental state for the felony); see also Dekens, 695
N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
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transfers the felon's mental state during the felony to the felon during
the commission of the homicide.239 If a felon commits a murder
during the commission of a felony, the law views the felon's intent to
commit the felony as the same intent necessary to commit the
murder.2 40  Thus, the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is
satisfied because the felon is held responsible for the death of the
victim.
24 1
The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is not satisfied,
however, when a third party, who is not the felon, commits the
homicide.242 Punishing a felon for the acts of a disinterested third
party does not comport with the societal goals of justice and general
utility.2 43 The felon's intent to commit a felony does not satisfy the
intent requirement for murder when someone other than the felon
commits the actual homicide.2 44 When applying the felony-murder
rule, the intent requirement cannot transfer from one person to
another.245 When courts, like the Dekens majority, transfer the intent
from the felon to a third party, the courts misuse the doctrine.246 One
of the major purposes of the felony-murder doctrine is to create
239. See TORCIA, supra note 8, § 147, at 296-97. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 317
N.W.2d 99, 101 (Neb. 1982) (establishing that the defendant's intent to commit a
robbery replaced the intent to commit the homicide under the felony-murder rule).
240. See TORCIA, supra note 8, § 147, at 296-97 (discussing how the law transfers the
intent from the felony to the homicide).
241. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
242. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting). Under the felony-murder doctrine, the
prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant had the intent to commit the
homicide, but the prosecution must prove that the defendant caused the death. See id.
(Heiple, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (Pa.
1958)). "[Tjhe thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is
malice and not the act of killing." Redline, 137 A.2d at 476.
243. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133-34 (Cal. 1965) (explaining that
the felony-murder doctrine cannot be justified if a proximate cause theory of liability is
applied).
244. See Dekens 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (noting that the felony-
murder doctrine did not function as a rule of causation but as a rule of intent); see also
Washington, 402 P.2d at 133:
When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his
victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber, for the killing is
not committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. It
is not enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen and that the
robbery might therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing.
Id.
245. See Washington, 402 P.2d at 133-34 (discussing the misapplication of the
felony-murder doctrine under the proximate cause theory of liability).
246. See Joslin, supra note 94, at 160-61 (explaining how the Illinois courts have
deviated from the original intent of the felony-murder doctrine when applying the
proximate cause theory of liability).
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liability solely for a felon or accessory who commits a homicide during
the commission of a felony. 247 The felony-murder doctrine does not
advocate the transfer of the felon's intent to any other person who
commits a homicide during the commission of a felony, whether that
killing is justified or unjustified. 248 Thus, the proximate cause theory
espoused by the Dekens majority extends beyond the original intent of
the felony-murder doctrine.24 9
2. Deterrence
Another "purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from
killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible
for killings they commit. ' 250 The Dekens majority mistakenly believed
that finding the defendant guilty of murder would further the
deterrence purpose of the felony-murder rule.2  In fact, the proximate
cause theory of liability does not serve as a deterrent.252 For
deterrence to be effective, the person contemplating committing a
247. See Washington, 402 P.2d at 133.
248. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 482-83 (Pa. 1958) (criticizing
the application of the proximate cause theory of liability on the basis that the homicide
was justifiable).
249. See Joslin, supra note 94, at 161 (discussing the misuse of the felony-murder
doctrine under the proximate cause theory of liability). "[T]he 'proximate cause' theory,
which imputes to the felon the acts of unrelated persons, is an unjustified extension
because it is nothing more than a mechanism of revenge." Id.
250. Washington, 402 P.2d at 133 (emphasis added); see also Jackson v. State, 589
P.2d 1052, 1053 (N.M. 1979) (holding that the application of the felony-murder rule is
limited and the "responsibility under this doctrine [should be kept] in line with the
evolving concepts of criminal law"); Redline, 137 A.2d at 483 (Bell, J., dissenting)
(imploring that "[tihe brutal crime wave which is sweeping and appalling our Country
can be halted only if the Courts stop coddling, and stop freeing murderers, communists
and criminals on technicalities made of straw").
251. See People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474, 476-77 (I11. 1997) (holding that the
proximate cause theory of liability fulfilled the deterrence purpose of the felony-murder
rule).
252. See Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. D.N. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. 1970)
(noting that the deterrent effect of the felony-murder rule is very doubtful); Morris, supra
note 32, at 67 (attaching responsibility for the unexpected result of a criminal action is
not as productive as attaching a greater amount of liability for the intended felony); see
also HOLMES, supra note 232, at 48.
The only blameworthy act is firing at the chickens, knowing them to belong
to another. It is neither more nor less so because an accident happens after-
wards; and hitting a man, whose presence could not have been suspected, is an
accident. The fact that the shooting is felonious does not make it any more
likely to kill people. If the object of the rule is to prevent such accidents, it
should make accidental killing with firearms murder, not accidental killing in
the effort to steal; while, if its object is to prevent stealing, it would do better
to hang one thief in every thousand by lot.
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felony must know the result of the felony and the consequences
attached to that result.253 The felon must have this knowledge in order
to make a decision whether or not to commit the felony. 254  The
proximate cause theory of liability for felony-murder does not serve
the deterrence purpose of the rule because an unintended act by a third
party cannot be deterred. 255 Thus, the majority in Dekens failed to
fulfill the deterrence purpose of the felony-murder doctrine.256 In
Dekens, the defendant could not have known that the victim would kill
the co-felon.257 Without that knowledge or without any intent to
commit a homicide, a felon should not be convicted of first degree
murder, even under the felony-murder doctrine.258
B. Prior Illinois Law
The majority claimed that the legal precedent in Illinois mandated the
holding in Dekens.259 Contrary to the majority opinion, no such
mandate exists to hold the defendant liable for the justified killing by
the intended victim. 260  The Illinois felony-murder statute does not
attach liability to the defendant when a third party commits a homicide
during a felony.26' In addition, the majority's support is founded
upon flawed legal precedent established in prior felony-murder
cases.
262
Specifically, the literal terms of the felony-murder statute prohibit
253. See Van Arsdell, supra note 123, at 214 (delineating the elements of deterrence);
I LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, §1.5, at 33-4 & n.26 (examining the requirements that
must be met for deterrence to be effective).
254. See Van Arsdell, supra note 123, at 214 (concluding that knowledge of the
consequences of the crime can produce a change of desire to commit the crime).
255. See Philip D. Zelikow, Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death
Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REV. 356, 376 (1978) (acknowledging that the
defendant has no control over the acts of the third party).
256. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 481 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (advocating that the
adoption of the agency theory would fulfill the intent of the felony-murder doctrine).
257. See generally Van Arsdell, supra note 123, at 214 (noting that for deterrence to
work a defendant would have had to expect a police officer, or in the instant case a co-
felon, to be killed during the commission of the felony).
258. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (concluding that the
proximate cause theory of liability does not support the justifications for the felony-
murder doctrine).
259. See id. at 476-78 (citing previous Illinois cases that adopted the proximate
cause theory of liability and the felony-murder statute); see also supra note 160 (listing
the Illinois Supreme Court cases that the majority discussed).
260. See id. at 478-80 (Bilandic, J., dissenting); id. at 480-81 (Heiple, J.,
dissenting).
261. See id. at 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 481 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
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the holding reached by the Dekens majority.2 63 The statute explicitly
states that the prosecution must prove that the felon personally killed
the decedent by "performing the acts which cause[d] the death. 264
The majority in Dekens did not explore nor explain the derivation of
the proximate cause theory from the Illinois felony-murder statute.265
Instead, the majority embraced the Committee Comments that referred
to the felony-murder statute.266 The Committee Comments, however,
are nonbinding.267 The plain meaning of the felony-murder statute is
dispositive in determining that if a person not involved in perpetrating
the felony commits a homicide, the felon cannot be held
responsible. 268 Therefore, the prior court decisions that the majority
used as support consisted of flawed and erroneous reasoning.269
Thus, the proximate cause theory does not find support in Illinois law
and cannot achieve just results.27°
C. Agency Principles
Instead of expanding the felony-murder doctrine beyond the
legislature's intended scope, the Illinois Supreme Court should have
adopted the agency theory of liability. 27' A defendant should not be
held responsible for any killing not attributable to himself or his
263. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting). The statute plainly states, "[a] person who kills
an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing
the acts which cause the death ...he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other
than second degree murder." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996).
264. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (quoting 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996)). Causation is not explained or illustrated by the
statutory language. See Van Arsdell, supra note 123, at 213. Therefore, the legislature
did not dictate the proximate cause definition the Illinois Supreme Court used. See id.
265. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 478 (overlooking the actual language of the statute
and, instead assessing the Committee Comments).
266. See supra note 122 (providing the relevant text of the Committee Comments).
The Committee Comments cited to cases where the felony-murder doctrine had been
applied in Illinois. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 Committee Comments of 1961
at 19 (West 1993). One of the listed cases was People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539 (I11.
1935), which adopted the proximate cause theory of liability. See id.
267. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 481 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (referring to the
Committee Comments as brief and nonlegislative).
268. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting). The majority offered the Committee Comments
as the only statutory support for its holding, but the Committee Comments cannot alter
the plain meaning of the felony-murder statute. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
269. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (asserting that the prosecution in the previous
cases did not prove that the felon performed the acts that resulted in the homicide).
270. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority had no basis for
finding the defendant guilty under the felony-murder statute).
27 1. See id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for continuing to use
the proximate cause theory of liability).
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accomplices acting in furtherance of the common felony. 72 The
agency theory of liability should be utilized in Illinois, as it is in the
273thmajority of other states, to promote the just and reasonable
application of the felony-murder doctrine.274 Thus, a defendant should
not be held liable for actions that he did not intend to bring about,
assent to, assist with, or contemplate.275 In the future, the Illinois
Supreme Court should return to the agency theory that it first embraced
in 1888 when applying the felony-murder doctrine.276
V. IMPACT
The Dekens decision has created an extensive basis of liability under
the felony-murder doctrine.277 Felons are now liable for acts they
could not have contemplated before committing the felony.278 In doing
so, a defendant can be held liable for a crime committed without his
knowledge or assent and committed by a party other than the felon or
accessory.2 79  Thus, a defendant will be held responsible for the
272. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (adopting the
agency theory and finding the defendant not liable because the homicide was committed
by the intended victim, not the felon); Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 478-
79 (Pa. 1958) (finding the defendant not guilty under the agency theory of liability for
first degree murder when a police officer killed a co-felon during commission of a
felony).
273. See supra note 73 (listing the cases from the majority of jurisdictions that have
adopted the agency theory of liability).
274. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 481 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
275. See Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1038 (Md. 1982) (holding that the
agency theory precluded the surviving felon from being charged under the felony-murder
statute when a police officer or intended victim shot and killed the co-felon).
276. See Butler v. People, 18 N.E. 338, 340 (Ill. 1888); see also notes 113-15 and
accompanying text (explaining the facts and holding of the Butler court). In general,
the Butler court applied the agency theory and reasoned that:
They [defendants] would be responsible for what they did themselves, and such
consequences as might naturally flow from their acts and conduct; but they
never advised, encouraged, or assented to the acts of Conrey [intended victim
that committed the homicide], nor did they [defendants] combine with him to
do any unlawful act, nor did they [defendants] in any manner assent to
anything he [intended victim] did, and hence they could not be responsible for
his conduct towards the deceased.
Id. at 339-40.
277. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 481 (Bilandic, J., dissenting); id. at 480-81 (Heiple,
J., dissenting); see also Joslin, supra note 94, at 161 (maintaining that the proximate
cause theory of liability exceeded the legitimate purpose of the felony-murder doctrine).
278. See Campbell, 444 A.2d at 1038 (citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass.
541, 544-45 (1 Allen 1863)) (deducing that the application of the proximate cause
theory of liability creates an unreasonable amount of liability).
279. See Butler, 18 N.E. at 340 (stating that it would be "a strange rule of law" if the
proximate cause theory of liability was applied to the felony-murder rule).
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actions of those assisting and those opposing the felonious actions.2"'
A defendant who commits a felony may also be liable for homicide if
he himself, his accessory, the law enforcement officer, or the intended
victim committed the homicide during the commission of the felony.2"'
The Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Dekens creates a great
injustice.28 2 The felony-murder rule has been criticized in the past for
creating unjust results.283 Instead of paying heed to the criticisms, the
court expanded the reach of the doctrine.28 4 Under the Illinois statute,
a person can be found guilty under the felony-murder rule for
committing a homicide during a forcible felony. 285 A forcible felony
encompasses "any ...felony which involves the use or threat of
physical force or violence against any individual. 28 6 The extensive
liability already provided for by the breadth of the statute is
compounded by the holding in Dekens.2 7 There are very few limits
on what can be classified as a forcible felony, 28 and now there appear
to be no limits as to who can commit the homicide.28 9 This is a serious
result when death is a possible punishment.290
280. See Campbell, 444 A.2d at 1038 (concluding that, in a proximate cause theory
of liability, the felon is responsible for the actions of the person that is attempting to
thwart the felon's criminal activity).
281. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 475-78 (citing cases in which a defendant was found
liable under the proximate cause theory); see also supra note 81 (listing jurisdictions
that have adopted the proximate cause theory of liability in felony-murder cases).
282. See Morris, supra note 32, at 50 (describing the results of cases that adopted the
proximate cause theory of liability for felony-murder). "Though their purpose of
deterring the commission of certain felonies is commendable, the means selected
appears to be socially unwise and is based on reasoning not free from substantial
analytic and historical errors." Id.
283. See Note, Felony Murder, supra note 35, at 1918 (stating that the felony-murder
doctrine is widely criticized).
284. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting). The felony-murder
doctrine had been questioned as being unjust; however, the majority court did not follow
public policy. See id.
285. See supra note 102 (interpreting the language of the Illinois felony-murder
statute).
286. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (West 1996).
287. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (listing the forcible felonies); see
also supra Part III.C (explaining the majority opinion in Dekens).
288. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8. Examples of forcible felonies include the
following: first degree murder, second degree murder, criminal sexual assault, robbery,
burglary, aggravated arson, arson, and kidnapping. See id.
289. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 477-78 (establishing that the proximate cause
theory of liability could create liability for a felon when an uninvolved third party kills
a co-felon).
290. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (West 1996); supra note 100 and accompanying
text (quoting the first degree murder statute).
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The court created the precedent for a felon to be held liable when
anyone commits a homicide during the commission of the defendant's
felony.291 The liability created by this decision is unfounded and does
not serve public policy. 292 The holding in Dekens will erode the basis
of justice and fairness in the Illinois criminal justice system. 293 The
broad based holding will not protect people from accidental killings; it
only serves to create a larger gap between "moral culpability" and
"criminal liability" in the felony-murder doctrine. 294 Therefore, the
court missed the opportunity to halt the expansion of unjust liability
and adopt a just theory of liability.295
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority in Dekens has extended the felony-murder doctrine
beyond any previous Illinois court decision. The proximate cause
theory of liability that the majority adopted is inconsistent with the
intent and legitimate purposes of the felony-murder doctrine. By
extending the felony-murder doctrine, the court unjustly held the
defendant liable for a death that the felony-murder doctrine does not
acknowledge. Dekens proves that the application of the proximate
cause theory of liability brings about unjust results. Therefore, Illinois
should reassess its use of the proximate cause theory of liability and
adopt the agency theory when applying the felony-murder doctrine.
Only then will Illinois achieve a just result.
KARA M. HOUCK
291. See generally Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 474-78 (creating the possibility for
extensive liability through the majority holding).
292. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480 (Heiple, J., dissenting). See generally Van
Arsdell, supra note 123, at 216. A commentary on the extension of the felony-murder
doctrine after the Hickman decision:
It does not serve the policy of rehabilitating offenders or protect society from
accidental killings. The extension fails to advance the policy of deterrence in
any direct and effective sense, and, to the extent that the policy of retribution
is served by Hickman, the policy entails random and arbitrary punishment.
Id.; see also supra note 171 (explaining the facts and holding of Hickman).
293. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter
stated, "not the least significant test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of
those charged with crime, particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a
community." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
294. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965).
295. See Dekens, 695 N.E.2d at 480-81 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (advocating the
adoption of the agency theory of liability for the felony-murder doctrine).
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